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The diagnostic and therapeutic approach to the patient is always charged 
with responsibility and tension for the physician and with expectations and 
fear for the patient. This is experienced in a more difficult and painful way 
when the patient has a neoplastic pathology of the gynecological sphere. 
There is the fear of having cancer and the uncertainty of the outcome of the 
therapy. There is also the pain of undergoing a mutilation of organs 
considered fundamental for the structure and recognition of one's female 
identity, with the consequent incapacity to procreate or other difficulties if 
the woman is pregnant. 
In these cases, one asks the physician to use not only his scientific 
competence, but also his humanity, so the patient can deal with this sad 
experience. Also in these cases, as in the whole practice of medicine, the 
physician and the patient cannot ignore that the decisions regarding clinical 
management involve fundamental ethical values regarding the human 
person, her life and her health. 
If we analyze the bioethicalliterature on the subject, we find that the 
solution to difficult or conflicting situations which arise in clinical practice 
is often looked for with reference to principlism and, in particular, to the 
principles of respect for autonomy and of beneficence. I In other words, the 
physician-patient relationship is reduced to two opposing sides. On one 
hand is the physician who, with his scientific knowledge, is able to identify 
the most useful strategies of intervention for the woman. On the other hand 
is the patient, with her expectations and convictions, but above all, with the 
right to choose the path that she believes most suitable. 
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In this context, the physician would act on the basis of the principle 
of beneficence, and would not only commit himself to not harming the 
patient (the principle of non-maleficence), but would also aim for the 
greatest good for her. The clinical choice is thus the result of the balance 
between possible risks and the expected benefits. However, one must also 
take into consideration the choice made by the patient, who would act on 
the basis of respect for her autonomy (recognition of moral autonomy, self-
determination, freedom of conscience), which then becomes concrete in 
the obligation of informed consent. Therefore, for the patient there are 
obligations based on the principle of autonomy, whereas the physician 
intervenes by virtue of the principle of beneficence. 
At first glance, referring to the above-mentioned principles may 
appear to be of great help in clinical practice. In reality, these principles are 
often in conflict with each other and make it difficult to answer the 
question "What should I do?" For example, if a woman, acting under the 
principle of autonomy, decided to refuse necessary therapy, a physician 
would not be able to act under the principle of beneficence to save her life. 
The presence of this conflict should not surprise: it is the logical 
consequence of the lack of a foundation of the principles themselves or, to 
be more precise, of the presence of a double and contrasting foundation , 
which is utilitarian on one hand (What is useful to do ?) and deontological 
on the other hand (What should I do ?). 
The conflict inherent in principlism is even more obvious when the 
clinical dilemmas concern not only the woman-physician dyad, but rather 
the woman-fetus-physician triad. Which principle should oblige the 
mother and the physician to act in the interest of the fetus? 
Certainly not the principle of autonomy, since the fetus has not yet 
acquired the capacity to make deci sions and to exercise his freedom; but 
not even, it is said, the principle of beneficence unless the fetus can be 
considered a "patient".2 And when can a fetus be considered a patient? 
Only when, one reads in Cervenak and McCullough 's paper, "the 
fetus has a good chance of becoming a child", or rather when it is in a 
viable phase (at least 24 weeks of gestation). Consequently one denies that 
the fetus may have subjective rights in any phase of his development and in 
any condition: if, in fact, the fetus is not yet viable, it is the mother who 
decides whether he should be considered a patient or not; if, however, the 
fetus is already viable, the clinical decision, whether or not shared by the 
mother, is to be taken by the physician in the interest of the fetus.3 
From what has been said, it is clear that there are some gaps in the 
appeal to principilism: in the name of autonomy one ignores the source it 
proceeds from, t at is the life that is its fundamental condition; in the name 
of beneficence one ignores the good of the patient. In order to resolve this 
conflict, to respect the fundamental rights (to life and the protection of 
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health) of all those involved, it is therefore necessary to think more deeply 
and revisit the meaning of the terms "autonomy" and "good".4 
First of all , in medicine the exercise of autonomy is not a monologue 
but a dialogue. The autonomy of the patient "talks" to the autonomy of the 
physician. The "subject" of the conversation is the good of the patient and, 
if present, of the fetu s, a good that unites them and that also has to 
overcome any personal interest. Moreover, what should one mean by 
"good"? According to Pellegrino and Thomasma, the "good" should 
include: the biomedical good; the concept that the patient has of his own 
good; the good as the possibility of exercising hi s freedom; the ethical 
good. And, if the first three dimensions of the good are already considered 
by the principle of beneficence and by the principle of respect for 
autonomy, it is the ontological dimension that has to be recovered, that of 
being a "person" who, beyond his accidental or secondary qualities, asks 
for respect and protection. 
- Therefore, the autonomy of the patient and of the physician talk 
about this good, for which they have to take responsibility. And it is 
precisely in the ethics of responsibility that the autonomy of the patient and 
of the physician meet the good they are born from and for which they live. 
On the other hand, responsibility cannot be separated from autonomy: in 
order to identify the ri sks, harm, advantages, that a human act - any 
human act performed in a voluntary and free way - can produce on 
nature, things, men, society. This responsibility is called on in the area of 
gynecological oncology in at least three steps: in prevention, in the choice 
of therapy and in assistance. 
Prevention 
It is a fact that in the aetiopathogenesis of gynecological tumors, 
individual behavior, generically defined as "risky", plays an important 
part, since it can be responsible for harming the patient's health, and in this 
case, her life too. 
It is enough to think about the association between cancer of the 
cervix and HPV, contracted most frequently by women who began their 
sexual activity at a young age (first sexual relationships between 15 and 17 
years old) in conditions of promiscuity5.6.7; or of the association between 
the consumption of tobacco (presence of NNK in the cervical mucus) and 
cancer of the cervix8 9 with reported non-progression of the histological 
modifications after suspension. 'o 
There is still the fear of a possible association - although the data 
available do not always agree - between ovarian stimulation for 
anovulation or in order to recover oocytes in artificial fertilization 
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protocols and epithelial ovarian cancerI I.12.13, whose risk is already 
increased in the presence of sterility 14, and breast cancerI5•16; between HRT 
(Hormone Replacement Therapy) epithelial ovarian cancerl 7, breast cancer 
and cancer of the endometrium l8; between the use of oral contraceptives 
and breast cancer l9 , especially if taken from a very early age20 ; between 
early miscarriage or abortion and breast cancer. 2 I,22,23 
And although it is true that a particular behavior is not always 
present in the aetiology of a cancerous pathology, having identified this 
association in a high percentage of cases has to make one feel the moral 
obligation to modify that behavior. 
In fact, health should be understood as a sort of balance that 
accompanies every day of one's life and that is to be sought after 
continuously. Health is a job, a lifestyle. In this way, health is defined also 
in relation to non-medical factors, which individual and collective choices 
and behavior can also influence. It is in the light of this interpretation of the 
concept of health that promotion and prevention become fundamental : 
promoting and protecting health is, even more than a right, a moral 
obligation. 
However, what form of prevention should be carried out? Two 
different strategies are proposed: the reduction of the risk in risky behavior 
and health education. 
Those who propose a strategy of reducing the risk in risky behavior 
start from the presupposition that there are people who, despite the fact that 
they know about and perceive the risk, in this case the oncogenous risk, of 
certain behavior, consider this risk to be acceptable or, in any case, to be 
taken. Preventive intervention should be limited to advice which can make 
it possible for people to persist in that behavior but with the least possible 
risk. It is obvious that this way one encourages the increasing lack of 
responsibility of the person who practices this kind of behavior, since she 
can continue to impose her choices. This is because there will always be 
someone who is willing to suggest suitable means and short cuts, thereby 
leading to the increasing lack of responsibility on the part of those who 
should be performing prevention, and who have no interest in intervening 
in order to remove the cause of this incongruous risk taking. 
Having the "remedy" as the aim of health education but not 
education itself is not enough. Real health education has to aim higher and 
accompany the individual in taking responsibility and acquiring full 
consciousness of what can improve his health and in making it possible for 
him to make choices in favor of his life and freedom. Health education is 
basically moral education. It asks for reasons for one certain type of 
behavior rather than another one. It aims to teach people to separate needs 
from desires and to help identify the jobs to be done to contribute to the 
protection of one's own health, and that of others. 
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As is known, prevention in gynecological oncology involves, 
together with health education and early diagnosis, predictive genetic 
tests24 and available options such as lifestyle changes, close follow-up, 
chemoprevention25.26, and even prophylactic surgery. 
The use of predictive genetic tests presents the physician and the 
patient with choices of great responsibility (i.e., informing the patient, 
safeguarding confidentiality, the need to inform the patient's relatives 
when they are equally at risk, the opportunity to perform tests during 
prenatal life27). There is also a difficult evaluation of the relationship 
between risks and benefits, as for example in the experimental 
administration of tamoxifen to healthy women. 
The Therapeutic Choice 
The therapeutic choice is also a moment of great and shared 
responsibility: a choice that is usually based on the so-called therapeutic 
proportionality. In fact, one opts for the intervention that is considered 
necessary in order to save the patient's life and to improve her health. 
This proportionality is sometimes difficult to evaluate. In addition to 
the type of therapy, we consider the degree of difficulty and risks involved, 
the economic and human costs of the treatment, the concrete possibilities 
of carrying it out, the expected benefits and the patient's desire for quality 
of life.28 In fact, it has been seen that only the patient, or if this is not 
possible, the relatives and physicians, are able to evaluate the quality of her 
life.29.3o The difficulty is born of distorted and utilitarian interpretations 
about the concept of quality of life. 
In order to evaluate the proportionality of the therapies, an 
appropriate, constant and truthful interaction of the patient with the 
physician is necessary. In fact, without being able to count on the 
professionalism of the doctor, the patient might not have the appropriate 
technical or scientific knowledge to understand her situation. Without the 
patient's input, and not sharing her experience, the physician might have 
only a general technical opinion, which may not necessarily be relevant to 
the patient's condition and therefore probably not "proportional" in the full 
sense. Effective therapeutic choices that correspond with the personal 
dignity of the sick person can only derive from a real therapeutic alliance 
between the patient and the physician. Asking for a personal opinion in the 
application of the principle of proportionality means assuming that the 
patient and the physician are both able to understand the whole truth of the 
person in the concrete situation. This will be possible only if they both try 
and recognize the fundamental values of life and human dignity, starting 
from an authentic way of judging in order to achieve a humanely 
proportional therapeutic decision. 
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From what has been said, it appears that each time the physician 
wants to start therapy, he has to ask the patient for explicit and informed 
consent. The patient will be able to decide freely and lawfully about those 
interventions that have a risky and uncertain or serious outcome. However, 
if she refuses necessary and valid interventions, she is not fulfilling her 
duty to protect her life. If thi s happens, the patient's refusal cannot 
automatically represent for the physician a lawful and sufficient criterion 
for suspending the therapy, since he, too, is responsible for the patient's life 
and not just for her options. 
A shared choice, however, means that both the physician and the 
patient should have the same information. This is a particularly difficult 
situation if the patient is not fully cognizant of the seriousness of her 
condition. What and how much of the truth should be communicated in 
such cases? When and how should this be done? 
This question has been fully discussed in the literature of 
specialists,31 which indicates, on one hand, the increasing need to inform (a 
neoplastic pathology is no longer necessarily a fatal disease; control of the 
disease often depends on the timeliness of the medical-surgical 
intervention; knowing the diagnosis is necessary in order to start secondary 
prevention interventions; the need is to start the patient on a clinical trial). 
On the other hand, there is difficulty in finding a balance between 
keeping quiet and communicating in a cold and impersonal way. In 
general, one must recognize the priority of the patient's right to be 
informed about her state of health, even if this right to know has to be 
modulated by the respect due to the person, that is, one has to be careful 
that the information does not further jeopardize the patient's health. Thus, 
the need to choose suitable words with respect to the circumstances, place, 
and timing, bearing in mind that informing does not mean the end of the 
physician-patient relationship: it is only the first step of a long, tiring and 
painful path. 
Pregnancy and Neoplasia: Is there a Mother-Fetus "Conflict"? 
The choice of therapy is more complex when one has to intervene in 
the presence of a pregnancy. Should the woman be treated as if she were 
not pregnant, or is it necessary to bear in mind that there are two patients, 
the mother and the fetus? Should one carry out therapy or not, knowing 
that it may harm the health or endanger the very life of the fetus? 
Moreover, there is another question for those who also take into 
consideration the possibility of abortion: can abortion be considered a form 
of "therapy" for a mother with cancer? 
Let us first study this last question. Abortion can never be justified, 
even out of a desire to avoid harm to the health and life of the fetus (no 
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harm can be more serious than an inflicted death) or out of fear that 
continuation of pregnancy may accelerate the evolution of the maternal 
pathology. Regarding this question, one can refer to studies carried out on 
the association of pregnancy and breast cancer, which indicate that 
pregnancy does not directly contribute to the development or to the 
acceleration of breast cancer, although one must point out that the 
physiological conditions of the breast during can delay diagnosis. 32• 33. 34 It 
has also been shown that sometimes when an abortion is suggested to 
reduce gynecological pathologies, melanoma for example,35 the fetus is 
actually the one in greater danger. 
So how should the presence of cancer in pregnancy be managed? 
Three different situations can occur: 1) The therapeutic intervention can be 
postponed until the end of pregnancy; 2) The therapeutic intervention has 
to be caITied out once the diagnosis has been made; 3) The mother refuses 
any therapeutic intervention. 
In the first situation, this would be a question of waiting for delivery, 
which is sometimes anticipated as soon as the pulmonary maturity of the 
fetus has been ascertained, in order to intervene medically and/or 
surgically. This is the case, for example, of cervical cancer. It has been 
shown that a mean delay of 16 weeks between the diagnosis of stage IE 
cancer and the beginning of therapy, coinciding with delivery, did not 
negatively influence the course of the di sease. 36. 37 
In the second situation, which is the most frequent one, a delay in 
therapeutic intervention could accelerate the evolution of the disease also 
with the risk of the woman 's death during pregnancy. That would mean the 
loss of both mother and fetu s. Therefore, on one hand there is the need to 
begin the therapy as soon as possible, and on the other hand, the 
responsibility for the health and life of not only the mother, but of the fetus 
as well. 
In these situations, the therapeutic choice will have to be adapted to 
the mother's clinical situation, although the physician will have to bear in 
mind that there are forms of treatment that can harm the fetus, depending 
on the phase of development reached. In fact, it is known that while there 
are no contraindications for the use of anesthetics in pregnancy, 
radiotherapy, even in extra-abdominal areas, can have an abortive or 
teratogenic effect. Chemotherapy has different effects depending on the 
period of the pregnancy: abortive and teratogenic effects during the first 
trimester; induction of pre-term delivery, inter-uterine growth retardation , 
and the possible appearance of tumors in the fetus in the second and third 
trimesters.38 
On the other hand, some follow-ups demonstrate that there have 
been no negative effects on fetuses whose mothers have undergone surgery 
or who have been treated with chemotherapy in any trimester of 
August, 2003 189 
pregnancy. 39, 40, 4 1, 42 Therefore it will be necessary to opt for the therapeutic 
intervention that harms the fetus as little as possible but does not deprive 
the mother of the necessary support. 
One certainly cannot overlook that the therapy can harm the fetus or 
even cause a miscarriage, but these occurrences can be justified from an 
ethical point of view, even though they are not directly desired, This is 
known as a double effect action; that is, in looking for the positive aim of 
the action (curing the mother) and in the absence of other risk-free 
remedies, one can accept the negative, foreseeable and inevitable effect 
(disease or miscarriage) but this is not directly desired. 
As previously mentioned, this double attention with respect to the 
mother and the fetus often occurs only if the woman has decided to 
proceed with the pregnancy, as though the existence of the fetus acquired 
dignity following the mother's choice. Now, no one can deny that the 
connection between the mother and her child is very strong. No one is in a 
position to make the best choice for the mother. It is also true, however, 
that it is the physician's duty to present the clinical reality of the case in the 
most objective way possible so that the decision is made in full awareness. 
In this clinical reality, one should also include the personal and 
objective reality of the fetus, whose dignity should be recognized by 
everyone and, above all, by the mother who is carrying him. She will 
certainly bear the greatest weight of the decision, especially in the third 
situation, the heroic decision not to undergo any therapy. 
The "Subsequent" Responsibility 
Finally, there is a last responsibility that concerns those who are 
involved in assisting the patient. That is the management of suffering, the 
unknown, the risks of the disease and the confrontation with death, all of 
which require assistance in addition to medical, of a psychological or 
spiritual nature, and is often lacking. 
A study carried out at oncology centers in Norway on 600 patients 
with tumors is indicative in this sense, since there is an increase in faith 
following the disease (an increase of religiousness in 24% of cases). This 
does not, however, correspond to a general provision of religious 
assistance, which is only provided in 57% of cases and on request.43 In fact, 
there seems to be a strong need to give a sense to the disease, to pain and to 
death, thus, the need for global assistance. 
When this assistance is lacking, it is inevitable that there appears the 
request to end one's existence, a request for euthanasia. And in fact, it is 
hypocritical to think of justifying euthanasia in the name of excessive 
technologicalization of medicine. There is a different reason. It is suffering 
and death that frighten people; it is being abandoned that makes people 
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vulnerable; it is the lack of charity and of solidarity by those assisting that 
pushes people toward an extreme choice. Actually, since euthanasia is an 
act totally against nature, one has the feeling that the patient's request is not 
dictated by her desire, which changes with time,44 but is rather the 
expression of a wish that is communicated, certainly not consciously or 
verbally by those assisting, who have become consumed and tired of being 
inert spectators to so much suffering, and who are unable to bear their own 
fragility and that of others. 
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